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Reference Point Adaptation and Disposition Effect 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the importance of reference point adaptation in the analysis of the 
disposition effect. We consider two exogenous factors pertinent to reference point adaptation: 
prior outcome and recent expectation of future outcome. We show that the incidence of the 
disposition effect varies in a manner consistent with reference point adaptation. Both prior 
outcome and recent expectation of future outcome affect the location of the reference point and 
have a large and significant impact on the incidence of the disposition effect. First, the 
disposition effect can largely be explained by investors’ inability to sufficiently adapt the 
reference point in response to large capital losses. Second, a negative expectation of future 
outcome, due to recent unfavorable information and highly speculative investments, accelerates 
reference point adaptation to price depreciation and dramatically increases loss realization. These 
effects are economically sizeable and are robust to plausible heterogeneity concerns and 
alternative explanations such as a belief in mean-reversion and managerial incentives.  
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The disposition effect, as defined by Shefrin and Statman (1985), describes investors’ tendency 
to hold losing investments too long and to sell winning investments too soon. The disposition 
effect is commonly explained in terms of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory and 
Thaler’s (1985) mental accounting framework. According to prospect theory, decision makers 
evaluate outcomes as gains and losses relative to a reference point using an S-shaped value 
function that is concave (risk averse) for gains and convex (risk seeking) for losses. Reference 
dependency is the core component of prospect theory because the reference point determines 
whether an outcome is judged as a gain or loss, which significantly affects the subsequent 
risk-taking decision. The disposition effect is a manifestation of the prospect theory, under the 
critical assumption that investors fail to adapt to losses and anchor the reference point at a price 
level higher than the current price.  
Although the essential premise of the prospect theory is that the reference point may change 
over time, empirical tests of specifically how a shift in the reference point affects the investor’s 
subsequent risk-taking decision and the disposition effect have been almost nonexistent.1 The 
existing empirical literature on the disposition effect typically assumes the initial purchase price 
as a fixed reference point. These studies show that when an investment is trading below the 
reference point, investors tend to be risk seeking. That is, they hold the losing investment by 
framing the sell decision as a sure loss and the hold decision as a gamble that provides the 
opportunity to at least break even. However, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Thaler and 
Johnson (1990) point out, the reference point in a dynamic setting (e.g., a financial investment) is 
not static and may shift away from the purchase price in response to the change in security price, 
which defines an adaptation level or adapted reference point..Likewise, Odean (1998) argues that 
                                                              
1 Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, and Lim (2008, 2010) provide extensive discussion on the relation between dynamic 
adaptation of reference point and the disposition effect, and a synthesis of the existing evidence on this topic. 
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although evidence of investors’ reluctance to realize capital losses supports the notion that 
purchase price plays an important role in determining the reference point, it may be only one 
determinant of the reference point.  
In this paper, we examine the implications of reference point adaptation for the disposition 
effect. Specifically, we empirically investigate the extent to which the incidence of the 
disposition effect varies in a manner that is consistent with reference point adaptation using a 
large sample of institutional investors’ trading records over a seven-year period. Because 
investors exhibit distinct risk attitudes in the gain versus loss domain, a shift in the reference 
point systematically alters the value of an outcome and subsequent risk-taking decisions. In 
particular, the incidence of the disposition effect depends on the discrepancy between the 
adapted reference point and the lowered current price. On the one hand, if the reference point has 
been fully adapted downward to the current price, the investor will less likely be risk seeking. On 
the other hand, if the adapted reference point remains higher than the current price, the investor 
is likely to hold onto the losing investment and exhibit the disposition effect. 
Motivated by the existing theoretical and experimental studies on reference point adaptation, 
we consider two exogenous factors pertinent to reference point adaptation—prior outcome (i.e., 
the magnitude of prior capital losses) and expectation about future outcomes—and examine the 
link between reference point adaptation and the magnitude of the disposition effect.  
First, we consider the influence of prior outcome on risk-taking behavior by examining the 
extent to which the magnitude of capital loss affects the incidence of the disposition effect. A 
large capital loss affects investors’ willingness to adjust the reference point downward to the 
lowered current price, creating a discrepancy between the adapted reference point and the current 
price, and induces risk-seeking behavior. Thaler and Johnson (1990) shows that individuals are 
  4 
more willing to adapt to a small to moderate loss than to a large loss. Specifically, a small to 
moderate loss increases risk aversion for subsequent gambles whereas a large loss numbs 
investors to additional losses.23 Furthermore, diminishing sensitivity of prospect theory’s value 
function reinforces the effect of a large loss on risk seeking. When an investor has yet to adapt 
completely to large loss and is already in the loss domain, a further loss only causes a small 
decrease in utility whereas a price recovery results in a large increase in utility.4  
Second, we investigate the extent to which the change in an investor’s expectation of future 
outcome, as a result of recent unfavorable information and the speculative nature of investment, 
affects the location of the reference point and the incidence of the disposition effect. In a recent 
reference-dependency model, Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) posit that the reference 
point is endogenously determined as rational expectations about future outcomes rather than the 
initial purchase price. Building on the essential intuitions in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory, they argue that an investor’s reference point is his or her recent probabilistic 
beliefs about future outcomes, which are largely determined by recent value-relevant information 
and the speculative nature of investments.  
In the context of the disposition effect, the location of the reference point depends critically 
                                                              
2 In their experimental study on how prior losses affect subsequent risk-taking behavior, Thaler and Johnson (1990, 
p. 650) find evidence that the disutility of a subsequent loss is not a monotonically increasing function of a prior loss. 
Specifically, the loss of $9 hurts more after a small to moderate loss ($9 or $30) but less after a large loss ($250 or 
$1000).  
3 Regret aversion and skill signaling help explain why investors are less able to adapt to a large capital loss. Odean 
(1998) suggests that investors are most loath to realize their greatest losses due to regret aversion. Harbaugh (2009) 
argues that investors take risky chances to win back large losses to avoid unfavorable signaling on their skills. 
4 To illustrate how the disposition effect is affected by the magnitude of prior capital losses, consider an investor 
who bought a stock at $45, and then the stock price goes down to $40. The price drop requires the investor to adjust 
the reference point downward to the current price by $5 to alleviate any discrepancy between the adapted reference 
point and the lowered current price. The investor is more likely to accept this small loss and evaluates future 
prospects relative to the current stock price. Consequently, the investor is unlikely to exhibit the disposition effect. If 
however, the stock goes down sharply to $25, the investor must adjust the reference point downward by $20. In this 
case, the investor is less likely to fully accept to this large loss and considers the subsequent decision as a choice 
between selling the stock for a sure loss of $20 and holding the stock, hoping to eventually break even. Hence, the 
investor will engage in risk seeking behavior by waiting for a price to recover before selling. 
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on how investors incorporate recent unfavorable information into their beliefs and update their 
reference point according to downward expectation about the future asset value. Similarly, a 
priori expectation of losing money influences the location of reference point. That is, investors 
are more willing to adjust the reference point downward after they experience a loss if they 
already foresaw a high possibility of incurring a loss (e.g., due to a highly speculative 
investment). 
We examine three kinds of stock-level and market-level unfavorable information: a stock’s 
recent underperformance, negative earnings news, and down market conditions. We hypothesize 
that unfavorable information accelerates reference point adaptation to price depreciation and 
increases loss realization. In the presence of a prior loss, investor updates their expectations 
about stock value downward after receiving unfavorable information. By equating the reference 
point with recent expectation, the downward expectation translates into a lower reference point, 
which, in turn, increases the investor’s willingness to sell a losing position.  
To examine the impact of the speculative nature of an investment on the disposition effect, 
we consider speculative nature at the stock level and the market level: namely, stock-level 
information uncertainty and market-wide investor sentiment, respectively. We hypothesize that 
investors are less prone to the disposition effect when trading high information uncertainty 
stocks and during high market-wide investor sentiment. That is, because an investor foresees a 
high chance of losing money in highly speculative investments, he or she is more willing to 
adapt the reference point downwards, closer to the lowered current price, after experiencing 
anticipated losses and is more willing to sell losing positions. 
Primary findings presented in this article can be summarized as follows. Prior outcome and 
recent expectation related to future outcome dramatically influence an investor’s subsequent 
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risk-taking decision and the incidence of the disposition effect in systematic ways. First, we find 
that the incidence of the disposition effect increases with the magnitude of prior losses, 
consistent with the notion that investors are less willing to adapt the reference point downward to 
a lowered current price after experiencing a large capital loss. Our finding indicates that the 
incidence of the disposition effect is largely explained by investors’ inability to adapt to large 
capital loss (i.e., positions that have depreciated more than 20% in value).  
Second, institutional investors’ propensity to sell losing position depends on their recent 
expectation of future outcome. Our findings indicate that both recent unfavorable information 
and the highly speculative nature of an investment accelerates investors’ adaptation to price 
depreciation and significantly increases investors’ propensity to sell a losing investment. 
Particularly, a stock’s recent underperformance, negative earnings news, and down market 
conditions increase the probability of selling a losing investment by 63%, 109%, and 64%, 
respectively. Similarly, the propensity to sell a losing investment increases by 353% when 
investors trade in stock with high information uncertainty and 102% during periods of high 
market-wide investor sentiment.  
Finally, we examine the overall impact of recent unfavorable information and the 
speculative nature of an investment on the disposition effect. Our findings suggest that a 
combination of recent unfavorable information or the speculative nature of investments can 
largely eliminate the disposition effect. Specifically, when all three exogenous factors related to 
recent unfavorable information are considered together, the incidence of the disposition effect is 
reduced by 90.74% and is effectively eliminated in stock with high idiosyncratic risk and during 
the period of high market sentiment. Furthermore, we find that the adaptation of reference point 
proves economically beneficial. The stocks sold that are associated with reference point 
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adaptation consistently underperform those that are not. Our findings are robust to a large battery 
of model specification checks, including full-set regression and regressions with investor-specific, 
stock-specific, and year-specific heterogeneity controls. Taken together, the empirical evidence 
indicates that both prior outcome and recent expectation about future outcome affect the location 
of a reference point and the incidence of the disposition effect. These results are consistent with 
the experimental evidence and provide direct empirical support for the recent behavioral models 
of Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009). 
One potential criticism leveled at the results is that they may be driven by the possibility that 
fund managers choose to hold the losing positions in attempt to improve their performance due 
to managerial compensation incentives (Brown, Harlow, and Starks 1996; Chevalier and Ellison 
1997; Koski and Pontiff 1999). To allay such a concern, we conduct the analysis separately for 
outperforming fund managers (midyear winners) and underperforming fund managers (midyear 
losers). We find that both midyear winners and losers are reluctant to realize losing positions 
relative to winning positions. In fact, midyear winners have a stronger tendency to hold onto 
losing investments than midyear losers. Our finding suggests that the risk-taking behavior does 
not depend on the fund manager’s interim performance and cannot be explained by managerial 
compensation concerns.  
Our study offers several substantial contributions to the existing literature. First, our study 
provides empirical evidence on the importance of reference point adaptation in explaining the 
disposition effect. Although both theoretical and experimental studies acknowledge that investors 
update the reference point over time, empirical evidence is lacking on whether and, if so, to what 
extent the shift of the reference point affects the incidence of the disposition effect. Second, we 
investigate a paramount theoretical model of Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) which 
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highlights the importance of recent expectation about future outcomes in explaining when and 
how the disposition effect is likely to be observed. Third, we offer the first-to-date empirical 
investigation of the disposition effect in U.S. institutional equity trading using high-frequency 
transaction data. Although the disposition effect is well-documented among retail investors, little 
is known about the existence of such biases among institutional investors. Our findings should be 
of interest to a wide audience, as institutions currently hold 74% of common stocks, compared to 
8% about 50 years ago. With a large fraction of aggregate wealth under their management, 
institutions are frequently the marginal price-setting agents in securities markets. An 
investigation of their trading behavior is necessary to understand the dynamics of stock prices. 
Lastly, our daily institutional trading data overcome the limitations of quarterly holdings data to 
allow us to investigate more accurately how institutional investors exhibit the disposition effect 
in equity markets. That is, the quarterly holdings data cannot accurately identify the timing of 
trades and do not reflect intra-quarter round-trip trades, which results in a significant number of 
missing trades.6 Furthermore, the purchase prices are assumed to be the closing price at the end 
of each quarter. This treatment deteriorates the accuracy for measuring gains and losses because 
the actual transaction price is generally different from the quarter-end closing price.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief 
review of existing literature and discusses testable hypotheses. Section 2 introduces the data and 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 presents a battery of robustness 
checks to validate our results from the baseline model. Conclusion is offered in the last section. 
 
1. Related Literature and Testable Hypotheses 
                                                              
6 Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2009) and Puckett and Yan (2010) estimate that use of quarterly data 
fails to capture more than 20% of trades due to intra-quarter round-trip transactions.  
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Prior theoretical and experimental studies show that investors adjust the reference point from the 
initial purchase price toward the current price in response to the prior outcome and recent 
expectation of the future outcome. Working from a psychological perspective, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) argue that people adjust the reference point away from the purchase price 
toward the current price in response to the change in security price, which defines an adaptation 
level or adapted reference point. Barberis, Huang, and Santos’s (2001) model assumes a 
benchmark, which serves as a secondary reference point that responds sluggishly to changes in 
the value of the risky asset. When a stock price moves up by a lot, the benchmark also moves up 
but by less. Conversely, if the stock price falls sharply, the benchmark also falls but not as much. 
Chen and Rao (2002) suggest that people immediately but incompletely update their reference 
point after experiencing an event. In recent experimental studies, Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, and 
Lim (2008, 2010) show that the reference point moves in a manner consistent with the prior 
outcome, shifting upward following a gain and downward following a loss, but the magnitude of 
reference point adaptation following a price change is not as large as the magnitude of price 
change itself. 
We consider two exogenous factors pertinent to reference point adaptation—prior outcome 
(i.e., the magnitude of prior capital losses) and expectation about future outcomes—and examine 
the link between reference point adaptation and the magnitude of the disposition effect. The 
magnitude of prior losses affects investors’ willingness to adjust the reference point downward to 
a lowered current price. Failure to fully adapt to a large loss creates a discrepancy between the 
adapted reference point and the current price, which leaves the investor in the loss domain and 
induces risk-seeking behavior. Given that an investor has not completely adapted to the large loss, 
a further loss will cause only a small decrease in utility whereas a price recovery will result in a 
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larger increase in utility. Thus, investors tend to be more disposition-prone after experiencing a 
large loss. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Institutional investors’ exhibition of the disposition effect increases with the 
magnitude of prior losses.  
 
In a recent reference-dependency model, Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) propose 
that a person’s reference point is his or her recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes, which are 
largely determined by recent value-relevant information and the speculative nature of 
investments. Because public information flows interact with investors’ belief formation (Harris 
and Raviv 1993; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Wang 1994; Karlson, Loewenstein, and Seppi 2009), 
investors update beliefs downward on the receipt of recent unfavorable value-relevant 
information. In the context of the disposition effect, adverse information accelerates reference 
point adaptation to price depreciation and increases loss realization. We examine three kinds of 
unfavorable stock-level and market-level information: (a) a stock’s recent underperformance, (b) 
a firm’s negative earnings news, and (c) down market conditions.  
A stock’s recent performance is salient information for investors to form expectations 
about future performance (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996; Chae 2005). When an 
investor observes the recent price path of a stock, the investor gradually incorporates the 
information into his or her expectation and thus updates the reference point. If the stock has been 
underperforming recently, the investor updates his or her beliefs about the stock’s price 
downward. As such, the investor will adjust the referent point to a lower level and will be more 
willing to sell the losing stock. Therefore, we state the first part of our second hypothesis as 
follows: 
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Hypothesis 2a: Institutional investors’ reluctance to realize losses is attenuated by the 
recent underperformance of the underlying stocks.  
Earnings news spurs investors’ revision of expectations and affects their adaptation of the 
reference point. Bernard and Thomas (1989), Chae (2005) and Chan et al. (1996), show that 
earnings news provides significant information about a stock’s value and that earnings news is 
positively correlated with subsequent stock returns. When an investor observes negative earnings 
news, he or she updates the expectation about stock’s price downward. By lowering the reference 
point according to recent expectation, the investor will be more willing to sell the losing stock. 
Accordingly, we state the first part of our second part of our second hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 2b: Institutional investors’ reluctance to realize losses is attenuated by 
negative earnings news events related to the underlying stock  
 
Down market conditions lower investors’ expectations for an individual stock’s 
performance (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998; Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed 
2004). That is, when the overall market goes down, investors are more likely to update the 
expectations and reference points downward, closer to the current price, and are more willing to 
sell losing stocks. Thus, we state the final portion of our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2c: Institutional investors’ reluctance to realize losses is attenuated in down 
market conditions. 
 
Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) argue that a priori expectation of losing money decreases 
aversion to realizing actual losses. Because investors foresee a good chance of losing money 
when investing in a highly speculative investment, they are more willing to adapt the reference 
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point downward after experiencing anticipated losses and are less willing to take chances to 
break even. We examine whether institutional investors are able to adapt to a large loss when 
they foresee a probability of losing money in highly speculative investments (as proxied by 
stock-level information uncertainty) and during highly speculative market periods (as proxied by 
market-wide investor sentiment).  
Previous literature argues that stocks with high information uncertainty are hard to value and 
difficult to arbitrage (Miller 1977; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Baker and Wurgler 2006, 2007; 
Kumar 2009). These stocks are characterized with high idiosyncratic risk, small market 
capitalization, and high volatility. We conjuncture that institutional investors have an expectation 
of losing money in high information uncertainty stocks and are thus more willing to liquidate the 
losing positions. Therefore, we state the first part of our third hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 3a: Institutional investors’ reluctance to realize losses is attenuated in high 
information uncertainty stocks. 
 
Finally, we examine speculative nature of investments at the market level, using 
market-wide investor sentiment to represent the biased expectations of market participants: A 
bullish (bearish) investor overestimates (underestimates) asset value (Brown and Cliff 2004). De 
Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that rational investors face the risk of 
sentiment when trading against noise investors. During periods of high sentiment, speculative 
traders have systematic optimism and increase speculative demand while sophisticated investors 
face higher risk from trading against them (Baker and Wurgler 2007; Lemmon and Ni 2009). To 
the extent that institutional investors are sophisticated, we conjecture that they are aware of the 
high risk associated with trading against noise traders during high sentiment periods and will be 
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more willing to adjust the reference point downward and liquidate losing positions. Consequently, 
we form the second part of our third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3b: Institutional investors’ reluctance to realize losses is attenuated during 
high investor sentiment periods. 
A useful representation of the relation between reference adaptation and the disposition effect 
using the prospect theory value function is illustrated in Figure 1. In presence of a small capital 
loss, the investor is at point SL, as shown in Figure 1a. The investor is more likely to accept the 
small loss and adjusts the reference point downward from the initial purchase price to current 
price (SL). In doing so, the investor will not be risk seeking. On the other hand, as the capital 
loss becomes large (LL), the investor is less likely to fully accept the total loss and only partially 
adjusts the reference point downward to point (R1). As such, a large capital loss creates a 
discrepancy between the adapted reference point (R1) and current price (LL). If a subsequent 
decision is made and the reference point is not fully adapted to the initial loss, the investor will 
likely be risk seeking. That is, a further loss will cause only a small decrease in the utility value, 
but a further gain will result in a larger increase. Figure 1b illustrates the effect of recent 
unfavorable information and highly speculative investments on the disposition effect. In the 
presence of a large loss, an investor updates his or her expectation about the stock’s value 
downward on receipt of unfavorable information. By equating the reference point with recent 
expectation, the downward expectation accelerates the investor’s reference point adaptation 
(from R1) to a lower level (R2). As a result, the investor will be less risk seeking and will be 
more willing to sell losing investment. Highly speculative investments enhance reference point 
adaptation in a similar fashion. Specifically, the investor adjusts the reference point downward 
(from R1) to R2, closer to the lowered current price (LL), after experiencing anticipated losses in 
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a highly speculative investment, and will less likely be risk seeking. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data, Sample and Summary Statistics 
We obtain proprietary institutional trading data from the Ancerno Ltd. (formerly the Abel/Noser 
Corporation) for the period of 1999 to 2005. Ancerno is a widely recognized firm that provides 
consulting and advisory services to institutional investors related to equity trading costs 
monitoring and measurement. The Ancerno data set identifies institutional investors’ decisions to 
establish or liquidate positions as well as the order execution. The Ancerno data set provides 
information about stocks traded, number of shares ordered and executed, execution price, order 
direction (buy or sell), and date of orders and the executions. The identities of the institutions and 
portfolio managers are not provided due to privacy protection, but the unique identity codes are 
used to track trades initiated by each institution and portfolio manager.7 Our analysis focuses on 
active mutual funds and excludes pension funds that explicitly follow inactive trading strategy. 
We obtain stock return, share price, and stock turnover from the CRSP daily tape and include 
only common stocks (share code 10 or 11) traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in our 
sample. To make sure our results are not driven by very small stocks or by bid–ask bounce, we 
delete stocks with a price of less than $1. We obtain analysts’ consensus quarterly earnings 
forecast and actual earnings per share from I/B/E/S. 
Positions. We define the beginning position as the point at which the investor purchases a 
stock and ending position as the point at which the investor sells the stock. To maintain the 
                                                              
7 Compared to the standard mutual fund database (Thomson Financial Mutual Fund Holdings database s12), 
Ancerno database’s distinct feature is that it tracks a complete record of a mutual fund’s trading. However, whereas 
the s12 database contains fund characteristics (fund classification by objectives), the Ancerno database includes no 
classifications information on funds’ miscellaneous attributes. 
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integrity of the data and filter out possible errors in identifying prior capital gains or losses, we 
follow Ivkovic, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005) and restrict the sample to trades for which we 
can unambiguously match purchase and sale dates. We exclude sales that do not have a 
preceding purchase and sales that are preceded by multiple purchases.8 When a single purchase 
is followed by multiple sales, we choose the first sale as the end of that position.9  
Gains and losses. On each position-day, we compare the holding period capital loss/gain 
against the purchase price on each position-day. If the position has a sell order on that day, we 
compare the volume-weighted executed price of the sell order to that of the buy order, which 
originates the position. On days that the position is held, we compare the CRSP closing price of 
that day to the purchase price.10 All prices are adjusted for stock splits and dividend 
distributions.  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of our sample. The final sample consists of 199 
institutions and 469 portfolio managers who place orders in 6,653 common stocks. We identify 
890,000 initiations of positions, which results in 23.9 million position-days. The average holding 
period (from initiation to first sale) is 27 days for a position. Institutions purchase approximately 
41.79 billion shares, representing $1.08 trillion in value. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
We estimate the extent to which institutional investors are prone to the disposition effect by 
                                                              
8 As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis with the sample including sale orders that are preceded by multiple 
purchase orders by using volume-weighted average purchase prices of each order as the purchase price. The results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. 
9 Institutional investors in our sample are less likely to engage in portfolio rebalancing when they liquidate their 
holding, as over 90% of the sales are of entire positions. 
10 We use closing price instead of bid/ask price to identify gain/loss to limit the observations with no price change. 
We also repeat all analysis using bid/ask price. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using closing 
price. 
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employing an extended Cox proportional hazard model (hereafter, the Cox-PH model). Recent 
studies on the disposition effect (e.g., Genesove and Mayer 2001; Ivkovic et al. 2005; Feng and 
Seasholes 2005; Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman 2010) report the advantages of a hazard model 
over several traditional approaches as a tool for investigating the disposition effect. In particular, 
Odean (1998) compares the proportion of losses realized (PLR) to the proportion of gains 
realized (PGR). A lower PLR than PGR suggests that investors are more reluctant to realize 
losses than gains.11 However, it is difficult to control for other factors that could be correlated to 
investors’ trading decision. To facilitate such controls, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) use a logit 
regression by regressing a holding indicator (1 = sell, 0 = hold) at the stock position level on a 
set of independent variables. The logit regression includes observations for each position on each 
day when an investor trades at least one security. Days in which an investor does not trade are 
dropped from their analysis. A potential problem with a logit regression is that it may give 
incorrect inferences in cases in which capital gains or losses vary over time (i.e., the model 
ignores the price path during the holding period of a position). The hazard model overcomes this 
limitation by including each position-day as a separate observation and thus can identify the 
time-varying nature of the explanatory variables. In addition, this model is especially suited for 
our setting due to the conditional nature of investors’ sale decisions: The probability of selling a 
position at time t is conditional on still holding that position at time t–1.  
For each day t after a position j is established (i.e., a stock is bought by an investor), we 
calculate hazard rate hj(t|X), the probability of selling position j at time t conditional on still 
                                                              
11 We also assess the robustness of our main findings using Odean’s (1998) proportional method. The results from 
proportional method are consistent with our findings using Cox-PH model. Specifically, we find that the ratio of the 
ratio of the proportion of gains realized (PGR) to the proportion of large losses realized (PLR) is 3.587, indicating 
that institutional investors exhibit a very strong disposition effect in large losses. In contrast, the ratio of the PGR to 
the PLR of general losses is 0.963, suggesting that institutional investors do not exhibit the disposition effect overall. 
In comparison, Odean (1998) reports the ratio of PGR to PLR equals 0.148/0.098=1.510, suggesting that retail 
investors are strongly disposition-prone.  
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holding the position until time t. We specify the hazard rate as 
 hj (t| X) = h0(t)exp(β*X). (A) 
The baseline hazard rate h0 (t) is essentially the hazard rate when all covariates take the 
value of zero. If we take logarithm of both sides, (A) is transferred to  
 log [hj (t| X)] = log[h0(t)] +β*X. (B) 
 Equation (B) shows that the log baseline hazard is analogous to the intercept in a linear 
regression model. The advantage of the Cox-PH model is that it does not impose a specific form 
of the baseline by allowing for a nonparametric baseline h0(t), which automatically captures 
fluctuations in hazard rate caused by differing holding time.  
X is the matrix of explanatory variables (i.e., covariates) that can be time invariant or time 
varying. The estimate for each covariate reflects an average effect of the covariate to increase or 
decrease the hazard rate during the holding period of a position. The sign of the coefficient 
indicates the direction of the covariate’s effect on the hazard rate. Specifically, a negative β1 
coefficient on X1 means that 1 unit increase in X1 lead to an absolute value of [EXP(β1) –1] 
decrease in the conditional probability of selling. Because the duration of holding a position is 
the time between establishing and liquidating a position, a lowered hazard rate implies a longer 
period of holding the position.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Disposition Effect (on average) 
We begin our analysis by examining whether institutional investors in our sample exhibit the 
disposition effect on average. To carry out the test, we use the univariate specification of the 
Cox-PH model:  
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 hj(t) = h0(t)exp(β1 * LOSS),  (1) 
 where LOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the position has depreciated in value 
from the time of purchase until time t.12 If institutional investors exhibit disposition effect, the 
coefficient for the capital loss indicator will be negative (i.e., a capital loss decreases the hazard 
rate), indicating that investors with a losing position will hold the position longer than a winning 
position.  
Model 1 in Table 2 reports the estimated coefficient and standard error for the capital loss 
indicator. The standard error is calculated using the robust covariance matrix clustered by each 
position to derive the statistic inference. The result shows weak evidence of the disposition effect 
among institutional investors. The coefficient on LOSS (–0.0334) suggests that an investor 
holding a losing position reduces his or her probability of selling by only 3.28% (exp (–0.0334) 
–1= –0.0328= –3.28%) or an equivalent increase in the expected holding time to liquidation. Our 
result shows a much weaker disposition effect for institutional investors compared to previous 
findings related to retail investors. For instance, Feng and Seasholes (2005) show that Chinese 
individual investors decrease the probability of selling by 36% when a stock is trading at a 
capital loss relative to a capital gain. The comparatively weaker disposition effect is not 
surprising because institutional investors possess a higher level of sophistication than retail 
investors. Our results are consistent with a growing body of literature that examines the relation 
between investor characteristics and the disposition effect and finds that investors that have a 
higher level of sophistication, literacy, investment knowledge, hold professional occupations, and 
have more trading experience are better able to adapt to prior losses and exhibit a weaker 
disposition effect (Shapira and Venezia 2001; Locke and Mann 2005; Feng and Seasholes 2005; 
                                                              
12 We use the indicator variable of capital loss; the omitted category is capital gain or no price change (in rare 
instances). According to this setup, the baseline hazard rate h0(t) corresponds to a capital gain. 
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Dhar and Zhu 2006; Seru, Shumway, and Stoffman 2010). 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
3.2 Magnitude of Prior Losses and the Disposition Effect  
We investigate whether and to what extent the magnitude of prior losses contributes to variations 
in the disposition effect. To conduct our tests, we characterize the Cox-PH model using six 
dummy variables corresponding to six capital loss intervals, with five bands representing an 
interval that lies within a 10% return band from zero to 50% and one band representing a loss of 
above 50%. For example, the dummy LOSS [0, 10%] equals 1 when the capital loss is greater 
than zero but less than or equal to 10%. LOSS [50%, 100%] equals 1 when the capital loss is 
greater than 50%. We express this model as 
 hj(t) = h0(t)exp( β1 * LOSS [0, 10%] + β2 * LOSS [10%, 20%]   
+ β3 * LOSS [20%, 30%] + β4* LOSS [30%, 40%]  (2a) 
+ β5 * LOSS [40%, 50%] + β6* LOSS [50%, 100%]). 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for six capital loss 
indicators. Institutional investors are clearly more likely to hold a stock if it has significantly 
decreased in value since the date of purchase. The evidence provides strong support for the 
notion that magnitude of prior loss affects investors’ willingness to adjust the reference point 
downward to a lowered current price and induces risk-seeking behavior, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Specifically, the estimated coefficients on LOSS [0, 10%] and LOSS [10%, 20%] 
are positive, suggesting that institutional investors are not disposition-prone with respect to small 
to moderate losses. In contrast, institutional investors are reluctant to sell a losing position once 
the loss exceeds 20%. The coefficient of –0.0582 for LOSS [20%, 30%] suggests that an investor 
facing a prior capital loss between 20% and 30% reduces her probability of selling the 
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investment by 5.66%. Moreover, the probability of selling significantly declines as the 
magnitude of the prior losses exceeds 30%. The estimated coefficients for LOSS [30%, 40%], 
LOSS [40, 50%], and LOSS [50, 100%] are –0.6617, –1.6585, and –1.5932, respectively, which 
are associated with a 48.40%, 80.96%, and 79.67% reduction, respectively, in the probability of 
selling.  
Because the coefficients are positive for small to moderate loss dummies but of opposite 
sign for larger loss dummies, we use more parsimonious representation in subsequent analyses. 
Specifically, we dichotomize capital losses into large and moderate losses rather than the six 
capital loss indicators. We characterize the Cox-PH model by including two dummies, 
LARGELOSS and MODERATELOSS, for large capital loss (loss >20%) and for moderate capital 
losses (loss ≤20%), respectively; the baseline is associated with either a capital gain or no price 
change. The estimation is represented as 
 hj(t) = h0(t)exp(β1 * LARGELOSS + β2 * MODERATELOSS). (2b) 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for LARGELOSS and MODERATELOSS 
are presented in Panel B. As expected, we find opposite signs of the coefficients on the large loss 
versus moderate loss indicators. The coefficient on LARGELOSS (–0.7980) suggests that an 
investor facing a large capital loss will have a large and economically significant 54.98% 
reduction in the probability of selling. In contrast, investors are not reluctant to realize a 
moderate loss. The coefficient on MODERATELOSS (0.0427) is positive but economically 
insignificant. The evidence on the relation between prior losses and investors’ subsequent risk 
attitude is similar to the observed patterns in Thaler and Johnson (1990), Odean (1998), and 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), although the exact reason for such a trend remains largely 
unexplained. Given that investors are less likely to fully adapt to large capital losses, the negative 
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relation between the magnitude of prior losses and the propensity to sell a losing position can be 
explained by the dynamic adaptation of the reference point within the framework of the prospect 
theory. In prospect theory, the propensity to sell a stock should decline as the stock price moves 
away from the reference point, given a positive expected return (Gomes 2005; Barberis and 
Xiong 2009). Our findings suggest that institutional investors are able to adapt to small to 
moderate losses and adjust the reference point downward closer to the current price, eliminating 
the discrepancy between the two prices. In contrast, institutions’ inability to fully adapt to a large 
loss creates a large negative deviation between the adapted reference point and the current price, 
which results in a lower propensity to sell a losing position.  
In the subsequent empirical analyses, we focus our discussion on the impact of a large 
capital loss compared to a moderate loss, given that institutional investors are able to fully adapt 
when an investment sustains a moderate capital loss but have a propensity to hold onto 
investments that incur a large capital loss. 
 
3.3. Recent Value-Relevant Information and the Disposition Effect 
We investigate the extent to which recent unfavorable information affects the reference point, 
which, in turn, translates into variations in the disposition effect. We examine three kinds of 
stock- and market-level unfavorable information: (a) a stock’s recent underperformance, (b) a 
firm’s negative earnings news, and (c) down market conditions. 
3.3.1 Recent Stock Underperformance  
We expand the model to include interaction terms for large and moderate loss indicators with 
past return variables. The interaction terms allow us to assess how a stock’s recent performance 
together with prior losses affects the disposition effect. We also include past returns as control 
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variables. We estimate the Cox-PH model using the following specification: 
 hj(t) = h0(t)exp( β1 * LARGELOSS + β2 * MODERATELOSS 
+ β3 * LARGELOSS * PastRet + β4 * MODERATELOSS * PastRet (3) 
+ β5 * PastRet). 
 We use the market-adjusted returns, calculated as the difference between the buy-and-hold 
returns of sample stocks and the return of CRSP value-weighted portfolio. We include 
market-adjusted return variables over seven non-overlapping trading-day intervals in the past one 
year: trading days –4 to zero (prior one week), days –19 to –5 (prior one month to prior one 
week), days –39 to –20, days –59 to –40, days –119 to –60, days –179 to –120, and days –239 to 
–180.  
Model 3 in Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for interaction 
terms of large and moderate loss indicators with past return variables. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms in intervals from day –4 to zero until days –59 to –40 (prior three months) are 
negative and statistically significant, which implies that a negative past return accelerates the 
speed at which investors liquidate losing positions.  
To elaborate, consider an investor who holds stocks X and Y, both of which are held as a 
large loss. Suppose stock X had a –15% market-adjusted return during the prior week, and stock 
Y had a zero market-adjusted return. The coefficient on the interaction term of the large loss 
indicator with past returns for days –4 to zero is–3.2966 (LARGELOSS *Ret[day0,–4]). Thus, 
the probability that the investor will sell stock X is 63.96% higher than the probability she will 
sell stock Y. In contrast, the marginal effect of a negative return on the propensity to sell 
moderate losses is economically insignificant. Under the same circumstance, when both stocks X 
and Y are held as moderate loss, the probability of that the investor will sell stock X is only 4.47% 
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higher than the probability she will sell stock Y. Moreover, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms of the large loss indicator with the most recent past return (Ret [day0,–4]) is the largest 
among all the interaction terms, suggesting that investors pay more attention to the most recent 
weekly return, consistent with Köszegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007) proposition that investors 
update the reference point based on recent expectation about the future asset value. 
Our results also show that the disposition effect cannot be explained by investors’ belief in 
mean reversion. The coefficient on LARGELOSS remains statistically and economically 
significant after controlling for past return variables. The LARGELOSS coefficient of –1.0713 
implies that the probability of selling a position with a large loss is 65.74% lower than the 
probability of selling a position with a capital gain or no price change, ceteris paribas. More 
importantly, the positive coefficients on past return control variables imply that investors are 
more likely to sell a stock that has recently performed well, conditional on the position being a 
capital gain. While recent outperformance induces investors to sell winning positions, recent 
underperformance increases investors’ willingness to liquidate losing positions. The finding 
suggests that a belief in mean reversion is not a sufficient explanation for the disposition effect. A 
mean-reversion investor would tend to hold underperforming stocks and sell outperforming 
stocks, regardless of paper losses or gains. 
Overall, our finding is consistent with Hypothesis 2a, which posits that a stock’s recent 
underperformance accelerates investors’ adaptation of the reference point to a lower level. 
Institutional investors are more willing to realize losses and exhibit a weaker disposition effect 
following a recent price decline.13 
                                                              
13 To capture potential nonlinear relation between past performance and disposition effect, we implement two 
additional tests: (a). We include dummy variables indicating whether stocks hit recent historical highs/lows over 
three (overlapped) intervals (past one-month, past three-month, and past six-month), and (b) we include dummy 
variables representing top/bottom momentum quintiles formed based on returns over three (overlapped) intervals 
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
3.3.2 Negative Earnings News  
We characterize the Cox-PH model to include the interaction terms of large and moderate loss 
indicators with extreme positive and negative earnings surprise dummies. The earnings surprise 
variables are also included as control variables. We estimate this model as 
hj(t) = h0(t)exp(β1 * LARGELOSS + β2 * MODERATELOSS 
+ β3* LARGELOSS * NegES + β4 * LARGELOSS * PosES 
+ β5 * MODERATELOSS * NegES  (4) 
+ β6 * MODERATELOSS * PosES 
+ β7 * NegES + β8 * PosES). 
 We define quarterly standardized unexpected earnings as (Xjt-Xjt-4)/Sjt,, where Xjt is actual 
earnings per share for quarter t, Xjt–4 is actual earnings per share for quarter t–4, and Sjt is the 
standard deviation of (Xjt–Xjt-4) in the previous eight quarters (Chordia and Shivakumar 2006). 
Following Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984), we rank stocks each calendar quarter based 
on the standardized unexpected earnings for that quarter to determine the deciles of the 
distribution. We use these deciles as the cut-offs to assign firms into 1 of 10 earnings surprise 
portfolios in the quarter subsequent to that quarter in which the cut-off point was determined. We 
define NegES (PosES) as a dummy variable if the stock is in the bottom (top) decile of the 
earnings surprise ranking. We also assess the robustness of our findings using dummy variables 
representing negative and positive earnings surprises; our conclusions remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
(past one-month, past three-month, and past six-month). The additional tests confirm our main findings. The results 
indicate that (a) investors are more likely to sell (hold) a losing position if the underlying stock hits the historical 
low (high), and (b) investors are more likely to sell (hold) a losing position if the underlying stock is in the bottom 
(top) momentum quintile.  
  25 
Table 3, Model 4, presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the interaction 
terms of the large loss indicator with a negative earnings surprise (LARGELOSS*NegES) along 
with other covariates. The positive coefficient of 0.7405 implies that a negative earnings surprise 
increases an investor’s propensity to sell a losing position by a very large and economically  
significant 109.69%, relative to a losing position without negative earnings news.14  
3.3.3 Down Market Conditions  
We characterize the Cox-PH model to include the interaction terms of large and moderate loss 
indicators with down market conditions as  
hj(t) = h0(t)exp (β1 * LARGELOSS + β2 * MODERATELOSS 
+ β3 * LARGELOSS * MKTdown 
+ β4 * MODERATELOSS * MKTdown  (5) 
+ β5 * MKTdown), 
 where MKTdown is an indicator variable that equals 1 for down market conditions, and zero 
otherwise. Down (up) markets are months in which the market excess return is less (greater) than 
zero. Market excess return is defined as the difference between the return on the value-weighted 
CRSP portfolio and the risk-free rate. We also repeat our analysis using an equally weighted 
CRSP portfolio as well as the Standard & Poor 500 index as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
The findings are qualitatively unchanged and not reported for brevity. 
                                                              
14 We also perform additional test to address the possibility that the impact of a stock’s underperformance and a 
firm’s negative earnings news may be subsumed by each other (Chan, et al. 1996; Chordia and Shivakumar 2006). 
We characterize the Cox-PH model to include both past return and earnings news variables. The results confirm our 
main findings and provide support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. We find that both stock’s recent performance and a 
firm’s earnings news have a strong impact on the incidence of the disposition effect and are not subsumed by each 
other. Specifically, when both past return and earnings news variables are included in the model, the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction terms of the large loss indicator with the seven past return variables change only 
slightly from Model 3 and remain economically and statistically significant. When compared to Model 4, the 
coefficient on the interaction term of a large loss with negative earnings news falls from 0.7405 in Model 4 to 
0.3497 in Model 5 but remains economically and statistically significant. Thus, our results suggest that the economic 
effect of negative earnings news on the disposition effect is reduced but not subsumed by past return variables. 
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Table 4 reports the estimated coefficient and standard error for the interaction term of the 
large loss indicator with the down-market indicator (LARGELOSS*MKTdown). The positive 
coefficient on the interaction term (0.4933) suggests that institutional investors are 63.77% more 
likely to realize a large loss in a down market than in an up market. The finding support 
Hypothesis 2c, which posits that down market conditions accelerate reference point adaptation 
and increase loss realization. That is, institutional investors are more likely to update their 
expectations and adapt the reference point downward in a down market after experiencing loss 
and are more willing to sell a losing position in down-market conditions. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.4. Speculative Nature of Investment and the Disposition Effect 
We investigate how institutional investors’ reluctance to realize large losses is affected by 
stock-level and market-level speculative natures. To carry out our tests, we use information 
uncertainty proxies to examine the speculative nature of an investment at the stock level, and we 
use a composite index of investor sentiment to examine the speculative nature of a stock at the 
market level. 
3.4.1 Stock-Level Speculative Nature  
We adopt three commonly used proxies for stock-level information uncertainty: idiosyncratic 
risk, firm size, and return volatility.  
Idiosyncratic Risk --- We use the average monthly idiosyncratic risk during the prior quarter 
before portfolio formation. Following Fu (2009), we define idiosyncratic volatility each month as 
the product of (a) the standard deviation of the regression residuals of excess daily returns on the 
daily Fama–French three factors and (b) the square root of the number of observations in the 
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month.  
Firm Size --- measured as the market capitalization at the portfolio formation date. 
Following prior literature (Zhang 2006), we conjecture that small firms are less diversified and 
have less information available for the market than large firms.  
Return Volatility --- calculated as the standard deviation of weekly returns over the year 
ending at the portfolio formation date. We measure the weekly returns from Thursday to 
Wednesday to mitigate nonsynchronous trading or the effect of bid–ask bounce in daily price.   
For each proxy of information uncertainty (IU), we sort stocks into three groups: IU-High, 
IU-Mid, and IU-Low. We define a dummy variable that represents the high information 
uncertainty group and characterize the Cox-PH model to include the interaction terms of large 
and moderate loss indicators with the high information uncertainty indicator as 
hj(t) = h0(t)exp ( β1 * LARGELOSS + β2 * LARGELOSS * IU_High 
+ β3 * MODERATELOSS + β4 * MODERATELOSS * IU_High (6) 
+ β5 * IU_Mid + β6 * IU_High. 
Model 6 in Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the interaction 
terms of the large loss indicator with the high information uncertainty indicator. For all three 
information uncertainty proxies, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 3a, which posits that 
institutional investors exhibit a weaker disposition effect when trading in highly speculative 
stocks. For instance, when using idiosyncratic volatility as the proxy for the speculative nature of 
an investment, the coefficient of 1.5129 implies that institutional investors are 353% more likely 
to liquidate a position in stock with high idiosyncratic than in other stocks. Similarly, the 
coefficients of 1.1519 and 1.2080 for small stocks and high volatility stocks, respectively, imply 
that a losing position in small stocks and high volatility stocks is 216% and 234% more likely to 
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be realized, respectively. Our results are consistent with the notion that institutional investors 
anticipate a high probability of losses when trading in highly speculative stocks and are more 
willing to adapt to losses. In contrast, institutions are more willing to assume risk and hold onto 
losing positions in the stocks that are perceived to be safer (i.e., low information uncertainty 
stocks). 
 [TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
3.4.2. Market-Level Investor Sentiment  
We now characterize the Cox-PH model to include the interaction terms of large and moderate 
loss indicators with a market-wide investor sentiment indicator as 
hj(t) = h0(t)exp (β1 * LARGELOSS + β2* MODERATELOSS  
+ β3* LARGELOSS * PosSENT + β4 * MODERATELOSS * PosSENT  (7) 
+ β5 * PosSENT), 
 where PosSENT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the composite index of investor 
sentiment is positive in the previous month, and zero otherwise. The positive (negative) 
sentiment index implies high (low) market-wide investor sentiment. We use the composite index 
of sentiment developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The sentiment index is created from six 
proxies of investor sentiment based on their first principal component. These proxies include 
variables that are positively associated with sentiment levels (share turnover, IPO volume, 
first-day returns, and the equity share in new issues) and variables that are negatively associated 
with sentiment levels (closed-end fund discount and the dividend premium). We obtain monthly 
sentiment index from Jeffrey Wurgler’s Web site.  
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficient and standard error for the interaction term of the 
large loss indicator with a positive market sentiment indicator (LARGELOSS*PosSENT). 
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Consistent with Hypothesis 3b, the positive coefficient for the interaction term of 0.7073 
suggests that high market-wide investor sentiment attenuates institutional investors’ disposition 
effect. In a high sentiment period, the probability of selling a large losing position increases by 
102.84%. We repeat our analysis, replacing the monthly sentiment index with a yearly sentiment 
index. We also include each individual component of the composite sentiment index (share 
turnover, IPO volume and first-day returns, equity share in new issues, closed-end fund discount, 
and the dividend premium) compiled by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and the market volatility 
index as an alternative proxy, which measures the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500 
stock index. In untabulated results, we find that when investor sentiment is high, institutional 
investors are less prone to the disposition effect, which is consistent with our main findings.   
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.5. The Overall Impact on the Magnitude of the Disposition Effect 
The findings thus far indicate that the disposition effect is affected by the magnitude of prior 
losses, recent unfavorable information, and the speculative nature of investment. We now 
conduct additional tests to explore the marginal impact of recent unfavorable information and the 
speculative nature of investments as well as their overall impact on the magnitude of the 
disposition effect.  
To examine the marginal impact of each proxy, we calculate the change in magnitude of the 
disposition effect from the baseline Model (2b). The marginal impact of recent unfavorable 
information and the speculative nature of an investment is large and economically significant. 
Specifically, the incidence of the disposition effect decreases by 20.28%, 87.74%, and 23.27% 
for recent stock underperformance, negative earnings news, and down market conditions, 
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respectively. Similarly, the incidence of the disposition effect is essentially eliminated for stocks 
with high information uncertainty and decreases by 38.34% during a high market sentiment 
period.15 
To examine the overall impact of recent unfavorable information and the speculative nature 
of an investment, we estimate two regressions including (a) all three exogenous factors related to 
recent unfavorable information and (b) two exogenous factors related to the speculative nature of 
an investment; at a baseline position, all covariates equal zero. Models 9 and 10 in Table 7 
reports results for the models including all covariates related to recent unfavorable information 
and the speculative nature of an investment, respectively. Our findings indicate that a 
combination of all factors related to recent unfavorable information or the speculative nature of 
investments can largely eliminate the disposition effect. Specifically, when all three exogenous 
factors related to recent unfavorable information are considered together, the incidence of the 
disposition effect is reduced by 90.74% and is effectively eliminated in stock with high 
idiosyncratic risk and during the period of high market sentiment.  
 [TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.6. Ex-Post Performance 
We evaluate ex-post outcomes following the sale of winning stock or the holding of a large 
losing stock. If the stock with a large loss subsequently outperforms the winning stock, then the 
institutional investor would have been better off holding stock. That is, the disposition effect is 
                                                              
15  To calculate the reduction in the disposition effect, we first estimate the hazard rate for a large loss with recent 
unfavorable information and the speculative nature of investment. We then calculate the percentage change relative 
to the sample average of –54.98% from the baseline model (Model 2b). For example, the hazard rate for a large loss 
with negative earnings news during the prior week of –6.96% (exp(–0.8126+0.7405)–1 = –6.96%) is used to 
calculate the change in the disposition effect –(54.98%– (–6.96%))/(–54.98%)= 87.34%). 
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justified by subsequent performance and making the sale was a poor decision, ex post. We 
employ an approach similar to Odean (1998) to calculate excess returns for 27 trading days 
(average holding period), 126 trading days (assuming semi-annual turnover) and 252 trading 
days after the trade. Returns are calculated in excess of CRSP value-weighted index. Our 
findings (available from the authors) are consistent with the notion that institutional investors are 
unable to adapt to the large loss and make poor trading decisions by holding large losing position. 
The stock with a large loss, on average, underperform the winning stock by 0.72%, 1.87%, and 
3.51% for the period of 27 trading days, 176 trading days and 252 trading days, respectively.  
Our main interest is to investigate the extent to which reference point adaptation affects 
ex-post outcomes following the sale of large losing position. If the large losing stocks sold due to 
reference point adaptation subsequently underperform those unrelated to reference point 
adaptation, then adaptation of the reference point is economically beneficial. We partition the 
sample of large loss realizations into two subsamples according to whether or not the sale is 
associated with recent unfavorable information and the speculative nature of investment, as 
described in Section 3.3. We then calculate excess returns for 27 trading days, 126 trading days 
and 252 trading days after the sales. For all three examination periods, we find that the losing 
stocks sold that are associated with reference point adaptation underperform those that are not. 
For instance, the underperformance in six month following the sales due to recent unfavorable 
information and speculative nature of an investment, on average, is 3.55% and 2.78%, 
respectively. 
 
4. Robustness Checks 
4.1. Full-Set Regression 
We now examine all factors together—the magnitude of prior losses, recent unfavorable 
  32 
information, and the speculative nature of an investment—and explore whether the impact of 
some factors on the disposition effect may be subsumed by other factors. We estimate the 
regression including all the exogenous factors, with the baseline being associated with a position 
that all covariates take the value of zero. 
Model 10 of Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for all covariates. 
The results from Model 10 show that each exogenous factor pertinent to reference point 
adaptation has an impact on the disposition effect and that one factor’s impact is not subsumed 
by another.16  First, the coefficient on LARGELOSS is –2.2352, and the coefficient on 
MODERATELOSS is 0.0345, indicating that institutional investors are strongly disposition-prone 
with respect to large losses while they do not exhibit a disposition effect in moderate losses. 
Second, the coefficients on the interaction terms of the large loss indicator with each of the 
factors representing recent stock-level and market-level value-relevant information remain 
qualitatively unchanged. This result indicates that institutional investors show a weaker 
disposition effect in large losses when the loss follows recent unfavorable information events. 
Third, the coefficients on the interaction terms of the large loss indicator with the stock-level 
information uncertainty proxy and investor sentiment remain qualitatively the same as in our 
main analysis. This result suggests that institutional investors exhibit a weaker disposition effect 
when trading in highly speculative stocks and during highly speculative market periods.  
 
4.2. Investor-, Stock-, and Time-Specific Heterogeneity 
4.2.1 Investor- and Stock-Specific Heterogeneity 
There may be unobserved fixed effects in selling probabilities specific to individual investor or 
                                                              
16 We report the results using idiosyncratic risk as the proxy for stock-level information uncertainty. The findings 
are robust to other alternative information uncertainty proxies. The results are available upon request. 
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stock. To explore the sensitivity of our main findings to such potential unobserved 
heterogeneities, we follow Ivkovic et al. (2005) to allow for investor- and stock-specific baseline 
hazard rates. We replace the homogeneous baseline h0(t) in Model 10 with an investor-specific 
baseline h0,i(t) that allows the baseline to vary across institutions (Model 11) and across 
institutions’ portfolio managers (Model 12). We also replace h0(t) with stock-specific h0,s(t), 
which allows the baseline to vary across stocks (Model 13). 
Models 11 and 12 in Table 8 present the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 
full regression set with the investor-specific baseline that varies by institution and institutions’ 
portfolio managers, respectively. After controlling for heterogeneity in investors’ trading 
behaviors, institutional investors’ reluctance to sell large losing positions is still prominent, and 
all exogenous factors pertinent to reference point adaptation still have a significant impact on the 
disposition effect. Model 13 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for full set 
regression with a stock-specific baseline. The magnitudes of all covariates of interests become 
even larger and remain statistically significant after including the stock-specific baseline. Taken 
together, the results confirm that our main findings are not simply an artifact of correlated 
cross-sectional differences in investor trading behavior or stock attributes. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2.2 Time-Specific Heterogeneity and Bubble Period 
We also address concerns that our findings are driven by specific time period in the sample. For 
example, during the technology bubble in the late 1990s, mutual funds that actively invested in 
the technology sector may find it optimal to ride bubbles and engage in post-peak sell-offs 
(Brunnermeier and Nagel 2004; Griffin, Harris, Shu, and Topaloglu 2009). We address these 
concerns in three ways. First, we reestimate the regressions in Model 10 by replacing the 
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homogeneous baseline h0(t) with a year-specific baseline, h0,y(t), to address the possibility of 
cross-section dependence produced by time-specific heterogeneity (Model 14). Second, we 
repeat our analysis including an investor–stock-year specific baseline (Model 15). Third, we 
address the possibility that our findings may be altered by different trading behaviors of 
institutional investors for tech stocks during the bubble period. To mitigate this concern, we 
repeat the analysis without technology firms (Model 16). We define technology firms as firms 
with the SIC codes 3570–3579, 3622, 3660–3692, 3694–3699, 3810–3839, 7370–7379, 7391, 
and 8730–8734.  
The last three columns of Table 8 present the estimated coefficients and standard errors for 
Models 14–16. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of a year-specific baseline as well as an 
investor–stock-year specific baseline. The estimated coefficients of all covariates of large losing 
positions and all exogenous factors pertinent to reference point adaptation are qualitatively 
unchanged after excluding technology firms. In addition, we estimate the regressions separately 
for the pre-bubble and post-bubble period of tech bubble. Following Griffin, Harris, Shu, and 
Topaloglu (2009), we define the run-up as the period from the beginning of our data set to March 
27, 2000. In untabulated results, we find that institutional investors tend to ride their losing 
investments longer than winning investments in both periods and that this tendency is attenuated 
by the exogenous factors due to reference point adaptation. 
 
4. 3.Managerial Compensation Incentive 
One potential criticism leveled at the results is a compensation incentive that may motivate fund 
managers to hold losing positions.17 Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and 
                                                              
17 Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) document that funds with the best recent performance attract higher 
inflows of new investment, while poorly performing funds are not penalized with significant outflows. Because the 
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Koski and Pontiff (1999) show that midyear underperforming fund managers have an incentive 
to gamble toward the end of the year in attempt to improve their performance while 
outperformers have an incentive to decrease the riskiness and lock in a winning year.  
To determine the validity of this concern, we estimate the regressions separately for 
outperforming fund managers (midyear winners) and underperforming fund managers (midyear 
losers). Each year, we identify midyear winners and midyear losers based on their portfolio 
returns for the first half of the year (January to June). The difficulty with our data set to measure 
fund’s portfolio return is that we lack information on share holdings. To construct share holdings, 
we follow Dvořák (2005) and cumulate trading flows of a given stock initiated by a given fund 
manager. In some cases, holdings may be established before the start of our data set and those 
shares are missed in the integration of trades up to holdings. To mitigate this problem, we keep 
the holdings series of a fund manager after the first year in which the first trade record of the 
manager appears in the data set. Following Barber and Odean (2000), we apply the CRSP 
monthly return to each stock in a fund’s portfolio at the beginning of the month and then 
calculate the fund’s monthly portfolio return as the beginning-of-the-month market value 
weighted average returns of all the stocks held in the portfolio. Finally, we derive the 
January–June performance as the cumulative portfolio returns during the first half of each year. 
We define funds whose performance is above median as midyear winners and funds whose 
performance is below median as midyear loser (Brown et al. 1996). 
The analysis for the second half of the year is presented in Table 9. If midyear losers have 
stronger incentives to improve performance due to managerial compensation incentives, we 
expect them to increase the funds' riskiness in the second half of the year by holding onto losing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
fund manager’s compensation typically changes in proportion to the fund’s inflows, the convex performance–flow 
relation produces a convex relationship between the fund’s past performance and the compensation of the fund’s 
manager.  
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investments. However, the negative sign on the LARGELOSS coefficient for both midyear 
winners and midyear losers suggests that both subgroups are reluctant to liquidate the losing 
positions relative to winning positions. Thus, the risk-taking behavior we report in our study does 
not depend on fund managers’ interim performance and cannot be explained by managerial 
compensation concerns. In fact, midyear winners have a stronger tendency to hold onto losing 
investments. The coefficient on large loss indicator is –5.2322 for interim winners and –4.1311 
for interim losers, suggesting that midyear winners are more likely to hold onto losing stocks 
than midyear losers. Our finding may reflect that the adjustment of risk taking by mutual fund 
managers in response to past performance due to managerial compensation incentives operates at 
the fund portfolio level, while the disposition effect operates at individual position level 
(O’Connell and Teo 2009).  
Some key differences exist with respect to the extent of reference point adaptation for interim 
winners and losers. First, midyear losers are more sensitive to market conditions. Down market 
conditions makes midyear losers sell losing investments more aggressively than midyear winners. 
This result is in line with Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009), who find that midyear losers tend to 
decrease risk to prevent job loss in bearish markets because employment risk is relatively high. 
Second, we find that although both midyear winners and losers are more willing to sell highly 
risky losing stocks, midyear losers sell less aggressively than midyear winners. The result agrees 
with conventional wisdom that midyear winners will not take risky positions to the same extent 
as do the losers for the second half of the year and suggests that interim good performance does 
not entice excess managerial overconfidence.  
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
  37 
4.4 Tax-Motivated Selling  
Previous literature documents evidence that the disposition effect is weakened in the month near 
the tax year-end as investors sell losing positions in order to reduce tax payment (Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) and Ivkovic et al. (2005)). Bhabra, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1999) show that 
mutual funds engage in tax-selling in October just before the end of tax year on October 31. 
Since tax-related sales typically occur just before funds’ October 31 tax year-end and that a 
significant portion of sale trades likely take place shortly before funds’ fiscal year end, portfolio 
managers may be more willing to sell losing positions in October. To explore the sensitivity of 
our main findings to tax related sales, we repeat the analysis without (a). Month of October and 
(b). One quarter prior to October 31. Consistent with prior research, the magnitude of disposition 
effect is larger for non-tax window than for tax window periods. Our finding of mitigated 
disposition effect by factors triggering reference point adaptation holds for both periods in and 
out of the tax window.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides empirical examination of the potential role of reference point adaptation on 
the disposition effect. Our evidence indicates that both prior outcome and recent expectation 
about future outcome dramatically influence subsequent risk-taking decisions and the incidence 
of the disposition effect in systematic ways. First, the incidence of the disposition effect 
increases with the magnitude of prior losses, consistent with the notion that investors are less 
able to fully adapt to large capital losses. Second, institutional investors’ propensity to sell losing 
position depends on their recent expectation of future outcome, which is largely determined by 
recent unfavorable information events and the speculative nature of the investments. Our 
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findings indicate that both recent unfavorable information and the speculative nature of the 
investment accelerate investors’ adaptation to price depreciation and significantly increase the 
propensity to sell a losing investment. These results provide direct empirical support for recent 
behavioral models of Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Our findings are robust to various 
changes in model specification, including full-set regression and regressions with 
investor-specific, stock-specific, and year-specific heterogeneity controls, and are not subjected 
to the alternative explanation such as mean-reversion beliefs, managerial compensation 
incentives and tax-motivated selling. Taken together, the empirical evidence indicates that both 
prior outcome and recent expectation about future outcome affect the location of a reference 
point and the incidence of disposition effect.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the data used in the analysis. The positions established are placed by 469 
portfolio managers from 199 mutual funds during the sample period from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2005. A 
position begins when a portfolio manager purchases a stock and ends when the stock is sold. A position-day refers to 
a day during the holding period. Following Ivkovic, Poterba and Weisbenner (2005), we restrict the sample to trades 
for which we can unambiguously match purchase and sale dates. We exclude sales that do not have a preceding 
purchase and sales that are preceded by multiple purchases. When a single purchase is followed by multiple sales, 
we choose the first sale as the end of that position.  
 
1999–2005 
Number of institutions 199 
Number of portfolio managers 469 
Number of stocks 6,653 
Number of positions (millions) 0.89 
Number of position-days (millions) 23.90 
Dollar volume purchased ($trillion) 1.08 
Share volume purchased (billion) 41.79 
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Table 2. Disposition Effect on Average and Impact of Magnitude of Capital Losses 
This table shows how holding-period capital loss affects the probability of an investor selling a position by 
fitting an extended Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox PH-model facilitates both time-invariant and 
time-varying covariates. A negative estimated coefficient suggests that the covariate decreases the probability 
of selling; a positive estimated coefficient suggests that the covariate increases the probability of selling. This 
table reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for loss indicators and different magnitudes of 
capital losses. Model 1 reports the estimated coefficient and standard error for the capital loss indicator. LOSS 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a realized or paper loss for that position-day. Model 2a 
characterizes the Cox-PH model by six dummy variables corresponding to six capital loss intervals, each 
representing an interval that lies within a 10% return band from zero to 50% and above 50% loss. For example, 
the dummy LOSS [0, 10%] is equals 1 when capital loss is greater than zero but less than or equal to 10%. 
LOSS [50%, 100%] equals 1 when capital loss exceeds 50%. Model 2b reports estimated coefficients and 
standard errors for large and moderate losses. LARGELOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the holding 
loss exceeds 20%, and zero otherwise. MODERATELOSS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loss is 
between zero and 20%. Robust standard error (in parentheses) is calculated using the robust covariance matrix 
clustered by each position to derive the statistic inference. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
  Model 1  
LOSS -0.0334 ** 
  (0.0025)   
 Model 2a  
Panel A 10% Band Dummies   
LOSS [0,10%] 0.0408  ** 
(0.0026) 
LOSS [10%,20%] 0.0505  ** 
(0.0064) 
LOSS [20%,30%] -0.0582 ** 
(0.0112) 
LOSS [30%,40%] -0.6617 ** 
(0.0172) 
LOSS [40%,50%] -1.6585 ** 
(0.0235) 
LOSS [50%, 100%] -1.5932 ** 
  (0.0226)   
 Model 2b  
Panel B LARGELOSS vs. MODERATELOSS 
LARGELOSS -0.7980 ** 
(0.0085) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0427  ** 
  (0.0025)   
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Table 3. Stocks’ Recent Performance, Earnings News, and Disposition Effect 
This table reports Cox PH models including the interaction terms of large and moderate loss indicators with past 
return variables and earnings surprise dummies. LARGELOSS is the large loss indicator, and MODERATELOSS is 
the moderate loss indicator. Model 3 includes interaction terms of the loss indicators with a stock’s percentage 
market-adjusted return variables over seven non-overlapping trading-day horizons for the prior one year: trading 
days –4 to zero (past one week), days –19 to –5 (prior one month to one week), days –39 to –20, days –59 to –40, 
days –119 to –60, days –179 to –120, and days –239 to –180. The regression also includes the seven past return 
variables as control variables. Model 4 includes interaction terms of the loss indicators with two news dummy 
variables. NegES is an indicator for stocks with extreme negative earnings news, and PosES is an indicator for 
stocks with extreme positive earnings news. Robust standard error (in parentheses) is calculated using the robust 
covariance matrix clustered by each position to derive the statistic inference. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Loss Indicators 
LARGELOSS –1.0713**  –0.8126** 
(0.0098) (0.0087) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0438**  0.0431** 
(0.0028) (0.0026) 
Interaction terms with large loss 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day0,–4] –3.2966**  
(0.0674) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day–19,–5] –1.5838**  
(0.0575) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day–39,–20] –0.7767**  
(0.0583) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day–59,–40] –0.3805**  
(0.0605) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day–119,–60] 0.1220**  
(0.0285) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day–179,–120] 0.1025**  
(0.0242) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day–239,–180] 0.1082**  
(0.0224) 
LARGELOSS*NegES 0.7405** 
(0.0502) 
LARGELOSS*PosES –0.0495 
(0.0638) 
Table 3 continues
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Table 3 (continued) 
Interaction terms with moderate loss 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day0,–4] –0.4379**  
(0.0473) 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day–19,–5] –0.0725**  
(0.0238) 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day–39,–20] 0.0515**  
(0.0210) 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day–59,–40] 0.0052  
(0.0210) 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day–119,–60] 0.0228  
(0.0115) 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day–179,–120] –0.0135  
(0.0106) 
MODERATELOSS*Ret[day–239,–180] 0.0587  
(0.0102) 
MODERATELOSS*NegES 0.0124 
(0.0239) 
MODERATELOSS*PosES –0.0302 
(0.0180) 
Control variables 
Ret[day0,–4] 0.2147**  
(0.0297) 
Ret[day–19,–5] 0.1819**  
(0.0163) 
Ret[day–39,–20] –0.0079  
(0.0143) 
Ret[day–59,–40] 0.0261  
(0.0146) 
Ret[day–119,–60] –0.0660**  
(0.0080) 
Ret[day–179,–120] 0.0846**  
(0.0074) 
Ret[day–239,–180] 0.0661**  
(0.0074) 
NegES 0.1493** 
(0.0124) 
PosES 0.2991** 
(0.0172) 
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Table 4. Market Condition and Disposition Effect 
This table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors for interaction terms of large and moderate loss 
indicators with a down-market indicator. LARGELOSS is the large loss indicator, and MODERATELOSS is the 
moderate loss indicator. The dummy variable MKTdown equals 1 if the monthly market excess return is negative, 
and zero otherwise. Robust standard error (in parentheses) is calculated using the robust covariance matrix clustered 
by each position to derive the statistic inference. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Model 5 
LARGELOSS –1.0422**  
(0.0122) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0299**  
(0.0033) 
LARGELOSS*MKTdown 0.4933**  
(0.0163) 
MODERATELOSS*MKTdown 0.0173**  
(0.0051) 
MKTdown 0.0478**  
(0.0036) 
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Table 5. Stock-Level Information Uncertainty and Disposition Effect 
The table reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for interaction terms of large and moderate loss 
indicators with high stock-level information uncertainty indicators. Panel A, B, and C report the relation between 
disposition effect and information uncertainty, proxied by idiosyncratic risk (IDIO), market capitalization (SIZE), 
and return volatility (VOL), respectively. Stocks are sorted into tertiles based on each information uncertainty proxy. 
The regression includes interaction terms of the loss indicators with high information uncertainty dummy; we also 
include the level of information uncertainty as controls. Robust standard error (in parentheses) is calculated using 
the robust covariance matrix clustered by each position to derive the statistic inference. ** indicates significance at 
the 1% level. 
 
 Model 6 
Panel A. Information uncertainty = IDIO 
LARGELOSS –1.4590**  
 (0.0136) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_High 1.5129**  
 (0.0176) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0464**  
 (0.0028) 
MODERATELOSS*IDIO_High –0.0234**  
 (0.0065) 
IDIO_High –0.2068**  
   (0.0044) 
Panel B. Information uncertainty = market capitalization (SIZE) 
LARGELOSS –1.0676**  
 (0.0107) 
LARGELOSS*SIZE_Small 1.1519**  
 (0.0179) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0445**  
 (0.0027) 
MODERATELOSS*SIZE_Small 0.0134  
 (0.0076) 
SIZE_Small –0.7976**  
  (0.0052) 
Panel C. Information uncertainty = return volatility (VOL) 
LARGELOSS –1.3218**  
 (0.013) 
LARGELOSS*VOL_High 1.2080**  
 (0.0172) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0463**  
 (0.0028) 
MODERATELOSS*VOL_High –0.0246**  
 (0.0062) 
VOL_High –0.1645**  
   (0.0042) 
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Table 6. Market-Level Investor Sentiment and Disposition Effect 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the interaction terms of large and moderate loss 
indicators with the positive market sentiment indicator. We use the composite investor sentiment index for investor 
sentiment developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The index is calculated from six proxies based on their first 
principal component. These proxies include share turnover, IPO volume, IPO first-day returns, the equity share in 
new issues, the closed-end fund discount, and the dividend premium. The dummy variable PosSENT equals 1 if the 
composite index of sentiment is positive in the previous month, and zero otherwise. Robust standard error (in 
parentheses) is calculated using the robust covariance matrix clustered by each position to derive the statistic 
inference. ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Model 7  
LARGELOSS –1.1215**  
(0.0118) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0368**  
(0.0030) 
LARGELOSS*PosSENT 0.7073**  
(0.0171) 
MODERATELOSS*PosSENT 0.0093  
(0.0055) 
PosSENT 0.3937**  
(0.0038) 
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Table 7. Full-Set Regressions 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for interaction terms of the large loss indicator with 
exogenous factors. Model 8 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for interaction terms of the large 
loss indicator with all covariates related to negative information. Model 9 reports the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors for interaction terms of the large loss indicator with all covariates related to speculative nature. 
Model 10 reports results for the full-set regressions. ** indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Loss Indicators 
LARGELOSS –2.0856**  –1.2682**  –2.2352**  
(0.0219) (0.0129) (0.0229) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0441**  0.0309**  0.0345**  
(0.004) (0.0035) (0.0044) 
Interaction terms with large loss 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day0,-4] –3.1193**  –2.2307**  
(0.0676) (0.067) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-19,-5] –1.5300**  –0.6525**  
(0.0572) (0.0471) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-39,-20] –0.7709**  –0.2529**  
(0.057) (0.0411) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-59,-40] –0.3921**  –0.2118**  
(0.0584) (0.0439) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-119,-60] 0.1157**  0.1241**  
(0.0274) (0.0209) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-179,-120] 0.1133**  –0.0001  
(0.0234) (0.0207) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-239,-180] 0.0841**  –0.0236  
(0.0222) (0.02) 
LARGELOSS*NegES 0.3494**  0.2245**  
(0.0542) (0.0527) 
LARGELOSS*PosES –0.0385  –0.1146  
(0.064) (0.0641) 
LARGELOSS*MKTdown 0.3986**  0.2874**  
(0.0169) (0.0171) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_Mid 0.8673**  0.9188**  
(0.0275) (0.0278) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_High 1.8150**  1.6495**  
(0.0251) (0.0266) 
LARGELOSS*PosSENT 0.5010**  0.3319**  
(0.0174) (0.0184) 
Interaction terms with moderate loss Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8. Full-Set Regression and Heterogeneity Controls 
This table reports results for the full-set regressions for robustness check. Model 11 allows for institution-specific baseline. Model 12 allows for 
institution-manager-specific baseline. Model 13 allows for stock-specific baseline. Model 14 allows for year-specific baseline. Model 15 allows for 
manager-stock-year-specific baseline. Model 16 estimates the sample without technology stocks and allows for manager-stock-year-specific baseline. Robust 
standard error (in parentheses) is calculated using the robust covariance matrix clustered by each position to derive the statistic inference. * and ** indicate 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Model 11  Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Loss indicators 
LARGELOSS –2.2445**  –2.2465**  –5.0097**  –2.2173**  –4.6161**  –4.9304**  
(0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0302) (0.0228) (0.0503) (0.0603) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0302**  0.0365**  0.0116**  0.0691**  0.0386**  0.0419**  
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.005) 
Interaction terms with large loss  
LARGELOSS*Ret[day0,-4] –2.3173**  –2.3019**  –5.1527**  –2.1398**  –5.6943 ** –6.3393**  
(0.0652) (0.0646) (0.1434) (0.0619) (0.1779) (0.2401) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-19,-5] –0.5901**  –0.5777**  –3.1413**  –0.4788**  –3.1721**  –4.0876**  
(0.0455) (0.0449) (0.0997) (0.0421) (0.1653) (0.247) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-39,-20] –0.1900**  –0.1824**  –1.8832**  –0.0356  –1.0402 ** –1.4025**  
(0.0396) (0.0386) (0.0966) (0.0358) (0.1222) (0.1919) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-59,-40] –0.1240**  –0.1162**  –1.3515**  0.0394  –0.6859  –0.4108  
(0.041) (0.0398) (0.0906) (0.0371) (0.1798) (0.3165) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-119,-60] 0.1804  0.1621***  –0.1385***  0.2324***  0.0963  0.0649  
(0.0224) (0.021) (0.0465) (0.0198) (0.0637) (0.1114) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-179,-120] 0.0624  0.0761**  –0.1970***  0.1076***  0.0031  0.3206**  
(0.0200) (0.0193) (0.0441) (0.0189) (0.0551) (0.0977) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-239,-180] 0.0306**  0.0426*  0.0242  0.0602***  0.1927**  0.4191**  
(0.0195) (0.019) (0.0381) (0.0187) (0.0564) (0.0948) 
Table 8 continues 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Model 11  Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
LARGELOSS*NegES 0.2221** 0.2220**  0.3404** 0.2843**  0.3152*  0.2026**  
(0.052) (0.0515) (0.0685) (0.051) (0.0206) (0.0838) 
LARGELOSS*PosES –0.0952 * –0.0909  –0.2728 * –0.0694  –0.2383 ** 0.0011 ** 
(0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0699) (0.0631) (0.1171) (0.1526) 
LARGELOSS*MKTdown 0.2778**  0.2632**  0.4568 ** 0.2444 ** 0.5622 ** 0.6510 ** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.0215) (0.0169) (0.0363) (0.0483) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_Mid 0.9034**  0.9016**  1.2543 ** 0.8742 ** 1.0931 ** 0.9713 ** 
(0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0309) (0.0277) (0.061) (0.0759) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_High 1.5957**  1.5768**  2.7390 ** 1.5145**  2.3601**  2.3952 ** 
(0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0355) (0.0261) (0.0626) (0.0794) 
LARGELOSS*PosSENT 0.2899**  0.3220**  0.6556**  0.2780 ** 0.6173 ** 0.5336 ** 
(0.0182) (0.0179) (0.023) (0.018) (0.0384) (0.0514) 
 
Interaction terms with moderate loss  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Heterogeneity control         
  Institution-specific baselines Yes 
  Manager-specific baselines Yes Yes Yes 
  Stock-specific baselines Yes Yes Yes 
  Year-specific baselines        Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9. Full-Set Regression Partitioned by Midyear Winners/Losers  
The table reports estimated coefficient and standard error for the full-set regression for the second half of the year 
(July to December). We estimate the regressions separately for outperforming fund managers (midyear winners) and 
underperforming fund managers (midyear losers). We identify midyear winners and midyear losers on a yearly basis 
based on their cumulative portfolio returns for the first half of the year (January to June). We define funds whose 
performance is above median as midyear winners and funds whose performance is below median as midyear losers. 
Robust standard error (in parentheses) is calculated using the robust covariance matrix clustered by each position to 
derive the statistic inference. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Winner Loser Difference 
Loss Indicators 
LARGELOSS –5.2322**  –4.1311**  1.0995**  
(0.1875) (0.0819) (0.2046) 
MODERATELOSS 0.0365**  0.0007  –0.0358**  
(0.0086) (0.0092) (0.0126) 
Interaction Terms with Large Loss 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day0,-4] –6.6548**  –5.8742**  0.7797  
(0.6744) (0.3465) (0.7582) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-19,-5] –3.8055**  –2.8321**  0.9729  
(0.5272) (0.3393) (0.627) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-39,-20] –1.1227*  –0.6656**  0.4570  
(0.4793) (0.2564) (0.5436) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-59,-40] –0.1638  –1.1140**  –0.9505  
(0.4092) (0.2659) (0.488) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-119,-60] –0.4362  0.4219**  0.8583**  
(0.2333) (0.1573) (0.2814) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-179,-120] 0.0355  –0.0243  –0.0598  
(0.152) (0.1706) (0.2286) 
LARGELOSS*Ret[day-239,-180] 0.4258**  0.1816  –0.2442  
(0.1634) (0.1163) (0.2006) 
LARGELOSS*NegES 0.6897  –0.1285  –0.8183  
(0.6431) (0.2757) (0.6998) 
LARGELOSS*PosES –0.1792  –0.6121  –0.4335  
(0.2786) (0.3154) (0.4209) 
LARGELOSS*MKTdown 0.1302  0.9167**  0.7871**  
(0.1409) (0.0706) (0.1576) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_Mid 1.1996**  0.5979**  –0.6009*  
(0.2225) (0.1022) (0.2449) 
LARGELOSS*IDIO_High 2.7365**  1.8072**  –0.9283**  
(0.2217) (0.1002) (0.2433) 
Table 9 continues
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Table 9 (continued)  
Winner Loser Difference 
LARGELOSS*PosSENT 0.8761**  0.6224**  –0.2534  
(0.1555) (0.077) (0.1735) 
 
Interaction terms with moderate loss 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
 
Heterogeneity control    
Manager-specific baselines Yes Yes Yes 
Stock-specific baselines Yes Yes Yes 
Year-specific baselines Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 1 The relation between reference adaptation and the disposition effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: The effect of prior capital losses on disposition effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: The effect of recent unfavorable information and highly speculative investments on disposition effect 
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